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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Smith asserted in his Appellant's Brief that the denial of credit for the time he
served on probation and was adhering to the terms and conditions thereof was improper
and failed to give effect to the unambiguous language of the statute. He contended that
the unambiguous language did not preclude the denial of credit for the time he was on
probation and adhering to the terms thereof, and to the extent that there was any
ambiguity remaining about that issue, lenity required that ambiguity to be resolved in his
favor.

Mr. Smith supported these arguments with extensive and detailed analysis,

particularly in regard to the proper interpretation of the statute, demonstrating precisely
why his position was the only result of an understanding of the plain, unambiguous
language in the statute.

That interpretation left an ambiguity as to one particular

scenario, which he pointed out should be resolved in his favor under the rule of lenity.
The State responded with several cursory and generic arguments which were
unsupported beyond general statements of overarching rules of law.

It responded to

Mr. Smith's specific points, particularly his analysis of the grammar rules at issue with
over-simplified assertions which ignored the grammatical underpinnings of the English
language. And ultimately, most, if not all, of the authorities to which it cited actually
strengthen Mr. Smith's arguments, revealing that both specifically and globally, the
denial of credit for the time spent on probation and adhering to the terms thereof is
inappropriate under the statute as it is written.
Additionally, Mr. Smith asserted that the district court failed to make an adequate
record below by not adhering to the strictures of I.C.R. Rule 47 (hereinafter, Rule 47),
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which requires orders to be entered as separate documents. The State admitted the
district court's error, but simply asserted it was harmless without proffering any proof as
to why such error might have been harmless. As the State bears the burden to prove
the error harmless and it offered no proof to that end, it failed to meet its burden.
Therefore, those errors cannot be deemed harmless.
As the State's arguments are markedly unpersuasive, Mr. Smith still maintains
that this Court should reverse the district court's denial of credit and remand this case
for a proper calculation of the time for which he should receive credit, or alternatively,
remand this case so that a proper and sufficient record might be established.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Smith's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Smith credit for the time he served
on probation.

2.

Whether the district court improperly denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion and
failed to provide an adequate record in regard to its denials of his Rule 35 motion
and motion for credit for time served.

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Smith Credit For The
Time He Served On Probation

A.

Introduction
The State's cursory and generic arguments against Mr. Smith's assertions are

markedly unpersuasive.

In fact, most, if not all, of the authorities to which the State

cites (when it cites authority at all) actually support Mr. Smith's assertions, further
demonstrating that the statutes governing credit for time served unambiguously do no
prevent the award of credit for time served on probation while the probationer adheres
to the terms and conditions thereof. The result of the unambiguous language is that the
statute does not address the scenario of when the probationer is adhering to the terms
of his probation. As such, the statute is ambiguous in regard to that particular scenario.
Therefore, the rule of lenity demands a resolution in Mr. Smith's favor in that regard.
Because the State has failed to demonstrate any reason to affirm the district court's
erroneous ruling, this Court should reverse the district court's denial of credit and
remand this case for a proper calculation of the time for which he should receive credit.

B.

The Prior Interpretations Of The Statute At Issue Are Inappropriate As They Fail
To Give Force To The Unambiguous Language Of The Statute, Which Does Not
Prevent A Probationer From Being Awarded Credit For Time Served On
Probation Adhering To The Conditions Thereof
The primary statute governing credit for time served is Idaho Code § 18-309.

It provides that:
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was

4

for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered.
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be
computed as part of such term.
I.C. § 18-309. 1 As described in detail in the Appellant's Brief (App. Br., p.8), the Idaho
Constitution has separated powers between the branches of government, granting the
Legislature the authority to enact laws, while only empowering the Judiciary to interpret
those laws. Mead v. Amell, 117 Idaho 660, 664 (1990). As a result, the Idaho Supreme
Court has recently and clearly held that where a statute is unambiguous, the courts

must give effect to the unambiguous language.
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011 ).

Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional
This holds true even where the

unambiguous language would lead to absurd or socially unsound results, as it is the
province of the Legislature, not the Judiciary, to address those results.

Id.;

State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003). The courts are not empowered to avoid
the policy implications of the unambiguous language merely because they disagree with
those results. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. Therefore, the State's arguments (and the
prior decisions regarding the interpretation of this statute) which deprive the statute of
its unambiguous meaning are improper and holding in favor of such arguments will

Mr. Smith recognizes that the Court of Appeals has reviewed this statute in the past,
but asserts that, as those prior rulings interpret the statute to bar the award of credit for
time served on probation adhering to the terms thereof, their interpretation is erroneous
and should be rejected. See e.g. Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869-70 (Ct. App.
2008); State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1987); see also State v. Soto, 2012
Unpublished Opinion No. 376, 2-3 (Ct. App. 2012), rev. denied. Instead, this Court
should look to the plain, unambiguous language of the statue and give it the appropriate
effect.
1
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result in a violation of the separation of powers established in the Idaho Constitution.
See id.
When determining the meaning of a statute, particularly an unambiguous statute,
the courts are to look to the plain meaning of the words used. See, e.g., Driver v. SI
Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 429 (2003). In order to understand those words, the courts must
necessarily apply the rules of grammar.

See State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462

(1999) (holding that courts look to the context in which the words are used in order to
help understand their plain meaning). These grammar rules are not policy-driven and
are designed to give effect to the ordinary understanding of the language itself.
See, e.g., James J. Burndly and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005). Ignoring, or worse, oversimplifying these rules, as the State has done in this case (Resp. Br., pp.6-7), creates a
situation where language loses its meaning and communal understanding of a statute is
impossible.

1. All The Definitions Of "At Large" Reveal That Mr. Smith's Argument - That It
Only Applies To Periods When The Probationer Has Absconded - Is The
Correct Interpretation
Mr. Smith provided a legal definition of the term of art "at large." (See, e.g., App.
Br., pp.8-9, 18.) The State provides three alternative definitions. (Resp. Br., p.6.) The
first two of the State's definitions - "not under corporal control" and "not in confinement
or captivity" - are essentially the same as that provided by Mr. Smith and are
inapplicable to probationary release.

The third definition, "not in prison," when

examined in its entirety, including the illustrative example, is also inapplicable to
probationary release.
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The first two definitions are inapplicable to probationary release because the
probationer adhering to the terms of his probation is corporally controlled and is
confined. Mr. Smith, for example, was subject to at least eleven "special conditions" 2 as
part of his probation which controlled where Mr. Smith could go and how he spent his
time (maintain full time employment (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), p.165), participate in treatment programs, including Cognitive Self Change, (PSI,
p.165), and undergo a mental health evaluation and participate in any subsequentlyrecommended treatment (PSI, p.233)). He was also confined in his movements, as he
would have to remain in Idaho unless his probation officer approved otherwise and
regardless of that, he was required to accept extradition back to Idaho if the State
demanded such.

(See PSI, p.166.)

In fact, he could not even change residences

without the written consent of his probation officer.

(See PSI, pp.224, 296.) These

terms, as well as all the others lawfully imposed on Mr. Smith, reveal that he was under
corporal control and was in confinement or captivity. 3

The fact that these were "special conditions" indicates that there were additional
common conditions which applied as a matter of course, all of which would further
restrict or confine Mr. Smith while he was on probation. For example, the April 22,
2009, report of probation violation alleged that Mr. Smith had failed to obtain written
permission to change residences from his probation officer. (PSI, pp.295-96; see also
PSI, p.224 (same).) The "special conditions" did not require that Mr. Smith needed to
maintain a residence or get permission from his probation officer to change said
residence. (See generally PSI, p.166.) In fact, the report of probation violation listed
that as a violation of "Supervision Condition (3)," and later listed independent violations
of "Court Order Special Condition (e)."
3 Noting specifically, the use of the alternative conjunction "or," which signals the
definition applies to either term. Thus, this definition does not require captivity, merely a
form of confinement, which exists through the enforcement of the terms of probation.
2
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Only by trolling the internet was the State able to find a third definition which, if
quoted just so, would support its argument. 4

And even then, the State failed to

appreciate (or more to the point, provide) the example which that dictionary used to
describe what it meant by "not in prison." (See generally Resp. Br., p.6.) That example
is: "The

escaped

prisoners

are

still

at large." Cambridge

Dictionaries

Online,

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/american-english/at-large?q=at+large

(last

visited May 25, 2012) (emphasis added). Thus, when the Cambridge Online Dictionary
defined "at large" as "not in prison," it meant that the person has escaped from prison.
Id. This definition actually supports Mr. Smith's argument that "at large" only applies to

those persons who have absconded (or escaped) and are thus, not confined, controlled,
or otherwise in custody. 5 See, e.g., Gonzales, 139 Idaho at 385 ("Gonzales never again
reported to her probation officer, and she remained at large for more than nine years")
(emphasis added). And as Mr. Smith's release was not secured by escape (but was
rather by the legal means of probation), all four definitions provided in the briefs support
Mr. Smith's position that a probationer is not "at large."

However, the State provided an insufficient citation for to this definition (see Resp.
Br., p.6), omitting, of all things, a URL reference to the web page to which it was
referring. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, 18.2, at 153-58
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). Luckily, through Google, the
actual
website
is identifiable.
See
Cambridge
Dictionaries
Online,
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictionary/american-english/at-large?q=at+large (last
visited May 25, 2012).
5 Mr. Smith recognizes that the escapee may be subject to legal restraint when
apprehended, but during the time he is escaped, he is not in the custody of any legal
authority, nor is he confined to any particular location by force of law, regardless of the
State's belief to the contrary. (Resp. Br., p.10.) The escapee is at large, free to go
where he will in his efforts to elude capture.
4
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Contrary to the State's only other argument in this regard, the statutory scheme
as a whole supports Mr. Smith's argument.

(See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) The statutory

scheme surrounding similar releases from incarceration (furlough and parole, for
example) both permit credit against the sentence for the period during which the person
is released.

In fact, Judge Schwartzman has already commented on the incongruity

within the statutory scheme where parolees are able to receive credit where
probationers (whose situation is nearly identical) cannot. 6 See State v. Jakoski, 132
Idaho 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1998) (Schwartzman, Judge, specially concurring).

As such,

Mr. Smtih's interpretations of the term "at large" and of the statute as a whole are
congruent with the overall statutory scheme.
Furthermore, the two statutes to which the State points are also congruent with
Mr. Smith's position.

(See Resp. Br., pp.7-8 (quoting I.C. § 19-2603 and I.C. § 20-

209A).) I.C. § 19-2603 includes the "at large" language, which as Mr. Smith has already
demonstrated, does not extend to persons on probation adhering to the conditions
thereof. As such, just as with I.C. § 18-309, probation is not included within I.C. § 192603's scenario where credit may be denied.
I.C. § 20-209A provides: "The time during which the person is voluntarily absent
from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the board of correction, or from the

custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not be estimated or counted as a part of
the term for which he was sentenced." I.C. § 20-209A (emphasis added). Here again,

Even if this Court accepts the State's proposed interpretation of the term "at large,"
this criticism reveals that the disparate treatment of parolees - allowing them to get
credit for the time spent at large on parole (see Richardson v. State, 90 Idaho 566, 568
(1966)) - is inappropriate. See Jakoski, 132 Idaho at 69 (Schwartzman, Judge,
specially concurring).
6
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the Legislature uses unambiguous language which does not extend to probation.

It

sets up two scenarios where a person is voluntarily absent. One is from a penitentiary,
jail or other Department of Correction facility.

The alternative scenario, set apart by

the conjunction "or," refers to "[t]he time during which the person is voluntarily
absent ... from the custody of an officer after his sentence."

See I.C. § 20-209A.

Since the probationer is subject to the custody of an officer (see App. Br., p.8 n.2), and
that custody begins after the sentence has been imposed, this alternative can only
apply to a person who was on probation (or other person similarly released) but who
has absconded. As such, the only interpretation of this statute which can give meaning
to both clauses, see, e.g., Athay, 142 Idaho at 365, is that the first clause applies to only
persons who are incarcerated and who are voluntarily absent from that incarceration
(i.e., escaped) from the place of their incarceration, and the second clause applies only

to persons who were released to the custody of an officer and who are voluntarily
absent from that probation (i.e., absconded). As such, this statute does not prevent an
award of credit to the probationer for the time he is adhering to the conditions of his
probation (i.e., not voluntarily absent from the custody of an officer after his sentence).
I.C. § 20-209A.

These arguments also demonstrate why the previous decisions

permitting the denial of such credit were inappropriately decided. 7

7

See, e.g., Taylor, 145 Idaho at 869-70; Sutton, 113 Idaho at 834.
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2. Contrary To The State's Unsupported Arguments, The Rules Of Grammar
Reveal That the Plain Language Of The Statute Does Not Include Probation
In The Period For Which The Defendant Is Not Entitled To Credit
Mr. Smith presented reasoned arguments as to the proper interpretation of the

statute and supported his interpretation with various authorities. Not only do the State's
responses over-simplify the grammar rules in application to this statute, they fail to
provide support for its assertions.

(See Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) Other than its quotes of

statutes, 8 the only authorities the State cites as it responds to Mr. Smith's assertion that

a probationer adhering to the terms of his probation was not at large are
Cornell v. Mason, 46 Idaho 112 (1928), a decision defining "escape" (as opposed to
"release on probation") 9 and Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365 (2005), which stands

The State cites I.C. § 18-309 (the statute at issue) and I.C. § 19-2523(e) (another use
of the term "at large").
9 As the probation statutes were enacted well after the Cornell decision (according to
the credits of the statute, I.C. § 19-2601, which allows for imposition of probation, was
enacted in 1972, as was I.C. § 18-309), it would be counterintuitive to base the
language used in those statutes only on that decision, and not the evolved
understandings and uses of the terms in subsequent years. In fact, the Idaho Supreme
Court has recently held as much, requiring appellate courts to look to the specific
meanings imbued to terms, such as terms of art, and to presume the Legislature
was aware of those specific meanings when it opted to use those terms.
Robison v. Bateman-Ha/I, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212 (2003) (discussing a situation where
jurisprudence expanded the definition of the term in question beyond a common-usage
definition for purposes of a specific statute). However, the definition of the term "at
large" has evolved since 1928 and has subsequently and consistently been used to
refer to only those times when the person is not in custody and whose whereabouts
are unknown.
See, e.g., Jacobson v. McMi//ian, 132 P.2d 773, 778 (Idaho
1943) ("permitting O'Connor to escape and be at large") (emphasis added);
State v. McKaughen, 108 Idaho 471, 472 (Ct. App. 1985) ("committed by the escapee
while he was at large") (emphasis added); Application of Chapa, 115 Idaho 439, 443
(Ct. App. 1989) ("a prisoner who escapes from incarceration should [not] be permitted
accrual of the time toward his sentence while he is at large") (emphasis added);
Gonzales v. State, 139 Idaho 384, 385 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Gonzales never again reported
to her probation officer, and she remained at large for more than nine years") (emphasis
added); Fullmer v. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) ("tak[ing] into
account the three days that [the defendant] was at large following his escape")
8
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for the well-established principle that statutes are to be interpreted so as to "give effect
to every word, clause and sentence of the statute."

(Resp. Br., pp.6-7 (emphasis

added).) The State did not provide any authority supporting its purported application of
"grammatical rules," such as its claim that all terms within a sentence are "directly
related" to one another, and thus, modify one another. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.67.) And apart from being an unsupported and inaccurate assertion of a "grammar rule,"
this assertion, encourages this Court to disregard the foundation of the language, ignore
the actual grammatical rules, and twist the statute so that it has the definition the State
wishes it had.

Such a transmogrification of the statute is inappropriate, especially

where the language is unambiguous. See, e.g., Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.
Such a disregard of grammatical rules does not, and cannot, give effect to the
plain language of the statute. In addition, despite its recognition of the rule articulated in
Athay, the State's attempted interpretation fails to give meaning to the two separate and
distinct clauses within the sentence.

(Compare App. Br., pp.14-15.) The two terms

which the State purports may modify one another ("by any legal means" and "at large")
are in two different clauses. (See App. Br., pp.14-15.) Adopting the State's rationale
deprives the two clauses of their individual effect within the sentence, and therefore,
violates the rule articulated in Athay. (See App. Br., pp.12-15, 18-21.) It also fails to
give meaning to the various phrases within those clauses, further depriving the
sentence of coherent and rational meaning.

As such, absent any discussion or

(emphasis added); compare Cornell v. Mason, 46 Idaho at 120. As such, this Court
should look, and give effect, to the modern use (as opposed to the archaic use) of the
term, as it would have been understood by the Legislature when it chose to use that
particular term of art. See, e.g., Robison, 139 Idaho at 212.

12

understanding of the basic rules of grammar, the State's interpretation cannot be the
"plain meaning" of the statute.

Rather, it is only the meaning the State wishes the

statute had, but as the Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the courts [and the
State] are not empowered to avoid the policy implications of the unambiguous language
merely because they disagree with those results. Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96.
Rather, the plain language, understood through a proper reading of the terms
based on the necessary underpinning grammatical rules, indicates that the term "by any
legal means" modifies only the term "release," and not the term "at large." (See App.
Br., pp.13-15.) To hold otherwise, and to ignore the rules of grammar, deprives the

unambiguous language of the statute of its plain meaning.
Operating from the plain meaning of the statute, it becomes clear that release on
probation fits neither the definition of "release" in this statute (because of the
Legislature's requirement that the release be temporary (see App. Br., pp.15-17)) nor
"at large" (because of the plain definition of this term of art in the law (see App.
Br., pp.18-24)). 10 As such, the plain meaning of the statute does not prevent an award
of credit for time served on probation while adhering to the terms thereof. The result is
that the statute is ambiguous in regard to whether an award for such time is appropriate
(since the statute does not specifically include or exclude periods of time when the
defendant is on probation and adhering to the terms thereof, but does explicitly include
periods of incarceration and explicitly exclude periods during which the defendant is "at
large," which, in this context, is commonly understood to be absconding from

10

The arguments over the definition of "at large" are sufficiently set forth in Section 8(1 ),
supra, and need not be reiterated here. They are incorporated herein by reference
thereto.
13

probation.). That ambiguity must be resolved in Mr. Smith's favor, pursuant to the rule
of lenity. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007).
As it did with the grammar rules argument, the State's attempts to brush away
Mr. Smith's responses to these issues are generalized and cursory. However, a more
critical and in depth examination of these arguments reveals that neither of the State's
assertions actually undermines Mr. Smith's arguments, nor do they correctly read and
apply the law to this case.
With regard to the term "temporarily," the State argues that the simple fact that
the person who violates his probation is necessarily brought back to court somehow
makes probation a temporary status. (Resp. Br., p.5.) It does not, however, provide
any analysis as to why that interpretation is somehow more appropriate than that
forwarded by Mr. Smith, which is supported by precedent.

(See App. Br., pp.15-17.)

Regardless, the State's interpretation is wrong because probation, by design, is meant
to be a permanent release (not "for a time only").

(See App. Br., pp.15-17 (quoting

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 821 (2007)).) The probationer who
adheres to the terms of his probation for the allotted period of time is not required to
return to the prison before being discharged.

Rather, the result for a case like

Mr. Smith's (i.e., involving a period of retained jurisdiction) is that the sentence is
reduced in length to a period of time equivalent to the period of incarceration which the
defendant has already served, and for which the defendant gets credit.

I.C. § 19-

2604(1 ). This leaves the probationer with no more time to serve and he is free to go
without restraint. See id. As such, the release is not for a time only.

14

The impact of that observation is apparent when a probationary release is
compared with a furlough. The furloughed inmate is required to return to the place of
his incarceration at the end of the furlough period.

See, e.g., State v. Chavez, 134

Idaho 308, 310 (Ct. App. 2000). In Chavez, the Court of Appeals articulated that, "while
on work release, Chavez failed to return to the jail at the end of his workday. He
remained at large for approximately five months. Chavez was consequently charged in
a separate case with escape . ... " Id. (emphasis added). 11 Thus, the requirement that
the person return, which is clear at the outset of the release, reveals whether that
release is intended to be temporary (i.e., the person is required to come back at a
designated time) or permanent (i.e., the person is not required to come back at any
particular time, if at all). Because release on probation does not require the probationer
to return to prison at any particular time, if ever, it is a permanent release.

Any

temporariness caused by the return to incarceration (see Resp. Br., p.7 n.2) does not
make the period a "temporary release," since there is no way at the outset of the
release period to determine when, if ever, that alternative will be enacted. As it is not a
temporary release, it cannot be included in the narrow scenario where credit may be
denied. See I.C. § 18-309.

This language demonstrates not only the difference between temporary and
permanent release, but also the proper use of the term "at large" in relation to such a
scenario. See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 310.
11
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3. To The Extent That There Are Multiple Rational Interpretations Of This
Statute, The Rule Of Lenity Requires That The Resulting Ambiguity Be
Resolved In Mr. Smith's Favor
As discussed above, none of the State's arguments undermine Mr. Smith's
assertions.

In fact, most of the State's cited sources actually support Mr. Smith's

arguments. However, to the extent that any of the State's positions are rational, that
only creates a scenario where there are multiple, rational interpretations of a statute. In
such a scenario, the rule of lenity requires that the resulting ambiguity be resolved in
Mr. Smith's favor.

See, e.g., Anderson, 145 Idaho at 103.

In this case, that would

mean that Mr. Smith should be credited for the time he spent on probation adhering to
the restrictions thereof.

Therefore, the denial of credit for the time Mr. Smith spent on

probation, in the custody of the Department of Correction, subject to the numerous
restrictions on his freedom, was improper and needs to be reversed under a proper
interpretation of the statute.

11.
The District Court Improperly Denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 Motion And Failed To Provide
An Adequate Record In Regard To Its Denials Of His Rule 35 Motion And Motion For
Credit For Time Served
The State concedes that the district court denied Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion on
improper grounds and did not comply with I.C.R. Rule 47 when it issued its orders in
that regard (writing them on the faces of the motions themselves). 12 (Resp. Br., p.3

By arguing that the error was harmless (Resp. Br., p.3 n.1), the State also necessarily
conceded that the district court's notation has the full effect of a properly-entered order,
and thus, this Court can consider and rule on the substantive issue (whether the denial
of the Rule 35 motion was proper, based on the rationale that it was filed untimely).
And while this Court does not have to accept the concession, if it chooses not to,
Mr. Smith's argument remains the same - that the district court improperly denied his
12
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n.1.) Because the motion was resolved on improper grounds, the district court did not
consider the various evidence Mr. Smith presented in support of his motion or rule on
merits of his argument. (See generally R., pp.229-247.) Because of that failure, this
case should be remanded for a proper resolution of the Rule 35 motion in regard to the
proper amount of credit to which Mr. Smith is entitled. As set forth in Section I, supra,
that calculation should include credit for the time Mr. Smith served on probation and
adhered to the terms thereof.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's denial of
credit and remand this case for a proper calculation of the time for which he should
receive credit. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this case be remanded so that
a proper and sufficient record as to his Rule 35 motion might be established.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2012.

-

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Rule 35 motion as untimely since his assertion was that the district court improperly
calculated the credit to which he was entitled. A Rule 35 motion for that reason does
not have a time-for-filing restriction. I.C.R. 35(c). Therefore, the district court's denial
premised on timeliness is inappropriate and the case should be remanded for a proper
resolution of the issues present in Mr. Smith's Rule 35 motion.
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